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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The broad purpose of the labor movement has always been to further the economic self-
determination of workers, to maximize working people's control over their economic destiny. Self-
determination is the goal, but what are the means? 
In the past and present state of capitalist society, the only real opportunity for most people to earn a living 
is by selling their labor as an employee to some employer. In that historical situation, workers can best 
promote their self-determination through unionized collective bargaining with their employer. Collective 
bargaining is the best means at hand, but it is only a means, not an end in itself. 
As the economic situation changes, new opportunities arise. In some cases, workers can break out of the 
employees' role and achieve the status of worker-owners of their business. Labor can hire capital (instead 
of the reverse). In this newfound role, the workers can have much greater powers to control their own 
economic destiny, to promote their own self-determination. But worker ownership also presents a whole 
new set of problems and challenges. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the two major forms of worker ownership in view of the overall 
goal of the labor movement, to promote democratic self-determination in the workplace. 
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The broad purpose of the labor movement has always been to 
further the economic self-determination of workers, to maximize 
working people's control over their economic destiny. Self-
determination is the goal, but what are the means? 
In the past and present state of capitalist society, the only real 
opportunity for most people to earn a living is by selling their labor 
as an employee to some employer. In that historical situation, 
workers can best promote their self-determination through 
unionized collective bargaining with their employer. Collective 
bargaining is the best means at hand, but it is only a means, not 
an end in itself. 
As the economic situation changes, new opportunities arise. In 
some cases, workers can break out of the employees' role and 
achieve the status of worker-owners of their business. Labor can 
hire capital (instead of the reverse). In this newfound role, the 
workers can have much greater powers to control their own 
economic destiny, to promote their own self-determination. But 
worker ownership also presents a whole new set of problems and 
challenges. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the two major forms of 
worker ownership in view of the overall goal of the labor 
movement, to promote democratic self-determination in the 
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workplace. 
In the United States today, there are two principal forms of 
worker ownership, the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) 
and the worker cooperative. Advocates of worker ownership can 
usually be classified as either "ESOP advocates" or "Co-op 
advocates." The current debate over the most appropriate structure 
for worker ownership is often conducted in terms of such matters 
as reducing taxes or gaining access to conventional capital markets. 
But this distorts and trivializes the basic issues. There is more 
involved than narrow technical considerations. 
Means reflect ends; structures embody principles. What is the 
goal? Our starting point here is the assumption that the goal is 
to extend democratic self-determination to the workplace. What 
is the best structure for the purpose of workplace democracy— 
not the purpose of minimizing taxes, not the purpose of obtaining 
conventional financing for management-dominated "employee-
owned" firms, not the purpose of undermining unions with 
"worker capitalism," and not the purpose of "saving jobs" by 
dumping dying plants and unfunded pension liabilities onto 
desperate workers? The purpose is workplace democracy in 
healthy, secure, and unionized firms. 
The United States has had two hundred years of experience with 
political democracy at the federal, state, and municipal level. How 
can democracy be extended from the communities where people 
live to the communities where people work? Political democracy 
embodies certain principles, and those principles are the starting 
point in drafting a blueprint for workplace democracy. Democracy 
is based on the one person/one vote principle. Any design for 
workplace democracy should embody that fundamental rule. 
Democracy is a method for people to govern themselves, not 
a method for property-owners to govern their property. Democracy 
must be people-based, not property-based or capital-based. Hence 
in a democratic workplace, the people hire the capital, not vice-
versa. And if labor hires capital, then the residual net income after 
all costs (including interest on capital) is a return to labor, not a 
return to capital. 
The voting and other citizenship rights in a democratic polity 
are personal or human rights, not property rights which may be 
bought or sold. Property rights are marketable so they can become 
highly concentrated in huge accumulations of wealth and power. 
Personal or human rights cannot be "bought" or "sold"; they are 
automatically distributed on a one-per-person basis. Hence if any 
democracy, political or industrial, is to endure, the basic citizenship 
or membership rights should be assigned as personal or human 
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rights, not as marketable property rights. 
In sum, there are at least three design criteria in the blueprint 
for a democratic firm: 
(1) one member/one vote (not one share/one vote), 
(2) the residual net income is a return to labor (not to capital), 
and 
(3) the membership rights are personal rights (not property 
rights). 
We shall argue that the worker cooperative legal structure satisfies 
these criteria. Indeed, the design criteria essentially define a 
worker cooperative in abstract terms. We shall also argue that the 
typical ESOP design does not satisfy these criteria. ESOP voting, 
in cases where employees have voting rights, is ordinarily on a 
one share/one vote basis; capital hires labor so the net return is 
proportional to capital, and the voting and other rights acquired 
through an ESOP are property rights, not human rights. 
What is an ESOP? 
The legal structure of any form of worker ownership can be 
analyzed according to how it reallocates and restructures the 
traditional bundle of ownership rights attached to the common 
voting shares of a conventional investor-owned corporation. 
The Conventional Ownership Bundle includes: 
1. The voting rights, 
2. The rights to the profits or net income, and 
3. The rights to the net book value of the corporate assets. 
In a traditional investor-owned corporation, these ownership rights 
are transferable property rights (as opposed to inalienable personal 
or human rights). 
In an employee-owned corporation, there is no restructuring of 
the conventional ownership bundle; the traditional ownership 
rights are simply owned as property rights by the employees of 
the corporation. Since the voting rights are treated as property 
rights in employee-owned firms, these firms usually violate the 
one person-one vote rule characteristic of cooperative firms and 
political democratic communities where the voting rights are 
personal rights. Moreover, since the profit rights are attached to 
the capital shares, the profits are allocated in accordance with the 
invested capital of the employees, not their labor as in a worker 
cooperative. 
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Employee-owned corporations come in two basic varieties: 
• direct employee ownership, and 
• indirect employee ownership through a trust arrangement 
such as an ESOP 
There are no tax advantages associated particularly with direct 
(non-ESOP) employee ownership. The better-paid employees will 
usually purchase the most shares in these companies, so the power 
and profits gravitate quickly to the managerial ranks. Hence the 
directly employee-owned firms tend to rapidly degenerate into 
management-owned companies (e.g., the Vermont Asbestos Group 
or the Mohawk Valley Community Corporation). 
Most examples of employee-owned corporations are ESOPs 
where the ownership is indirect through an employee stock 
ownership trust or ESOT. The present form of the ESOP was 
established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) of 1974. As in a pension plan, the corporate contributions 
to an ESOP are exempt from the corporate income tax. But, unlike 
an ordinary pension plan, an ESOP invests in the employer's 
stock—which makes an ESOP into a new vehicle for employee 
ownership (but a risky substitute for a pension plan). 
The principal novelty lies in the "leveraged" ESOP arrangement 
wherein the ESOP gets a bank loan that is guaranteed by the 
corporation. The ESOP uses the money to buy stock from the 
corporation and then the stock serves as collateral for the loan. 
The company's periodic cash contributions to the ESOP are 
funneled through to pay off the bank loan. A tax break is captured 
because the company contributions count as deferred labor 
compensation, so the company pays back both the principal and 
interest on the loan with earnings that are deductible from taxable 
corporate income. Under conventional ownership, only the 
interest can be deducted as an expense. As the loan is paid off, 
the ESOP shares are allocated to the employees' accounts. The 
employees do not acquire direct ownership of their shares until 
they terminate their employment with the company or retire. The 
employees' shares end up being paid for by the dilution of the 
existing shareholders and by the foregone taxes. 
The main tax advantage to the company is the ability to deduct 
the value of shares issued to an ESOP from the taxable corporate 
income. The recent Tax Reform Act of 1984 has increased the tax-
favored status of ESOPs for companies, owners, and banks. The 
taxable income to a bank is the interest paid on a bank loan. On 
a loan to the leveraged ESOP, 50% of the interest is now tax-free 
to the bank. Dividends paid out on stock held in an ESOP are 
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deductible from corporate income whereas dividends on other 
shares come out of after-tax corporate income. If an owner sells 
a business to an ESOP and reinvests the proceeds in the securities 
of another business within a year, then the "rollover" is tax-free. 
These tax-breaks have made the ESOP into a highly favored 
financial instrument. But an instrument for whom? And for what 
purpose? 
The original architect of the ESOP was a corporate and 
investment banking lawyer, Louis Kelso, who has co-authored 
books entitled The Capitalist Manifesto and How to Tarn Eighty 
MilUon Workers Into CapitaUsts on Borrowed Money. The 
conservative but populist aspects of the Kelso plan appealed to 
Senator Russell Long, who pushed the original ESOP legislation 
through Congress and who has continued to spearhead the ESOP 
legislation. 
ESOPs are usually established by corporate managers or owners 
who are interested in the tax benefits and who are not particularly 
interested in transferring any power or control to the employees. 
The vast majority of ESOPs are in companies where they represent 
only a small percentage of the ownership. In almost all ESOPs, 
majority or minority, the shares are distributed in proportion to 
pay so the distribution of votes and profits is as skewed as the 
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wage and salary differentials within the company. An employee 
usually does not receive the vote on a share until the share is "paid 
for" by paying off the loan through the ESOP, and even then only 
if the vote is "passed through" to the employees. In the meantime, 
the votes are exercised by the trust committee often selected by 
the financiers and management. 
What is a Worker Cooperative? 
A worker cooperative restructures the conventional bundle of 
ownership rights listed above. The first two rights—the voting 
rights and the profit rights—constitute what are called membership 
rights. A corporation is a worker cooperative if those membership 
rights are personal rights attached to the functional role of working 
in the company. Each worker-member gets one and only one vote. 
The net income is assigned to the worker-members on the basis 
of their labor (measured by hours or by pay). In a worker 
cooperative, the third ownership right to the net book value 
remains a property right held by the worker-members of the 
cooperative through some appropriate legal mechanism. 
In a worker cooperative, labor hires capital so the structure is 
labor-based or "labor-ist." In a conventional corporation, 
employee-owned or absentee-owned, capital hires labor so the 
structure is capital-based or "capital-ist." Since labor is the hiring 
factor in a worker cooperative, the voting and profit rights are 
assigned to the people who work in the firm, not to capital, even 
though the members will supply capital to the firm by their 
membership fees and through retained earnings. This member-
supplied capital is recorded by a system of internal capital 
accounts or by other means, and it receives a fixed interest-like 
return. The positive or negative economic net income, after normal 
expenses and after the interest-like return on member capital, is 
assigned to the members on the basis of their labor (called 
"patronage"). Since the membership rights are not proportional 
to this member-supplied capital, the members could, depending 
on their seniority, have quite different amounts of capital in their 
internal accounts and yet have the same voting rights and the same 
rights to patronage returns based on current labor. 
ESOPs and the Labor Movement 
Louis Kelso and Senator Russell Long have a vision, a vision of 
the ESOP as a central instrument to broaden the ownership of 
corporate capital and to revitalize capitalism by "giving the little 
guy a piece of the action." It is a vision of "workers' capitalism," 
a vision of "turning eighty million workers into capitalists on 
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borrowed money." 
Any fundamentally pro-labor transformation of American 
industry must take place with the active support of the American 
labor movement. Labor is understandably skeptical of a program 
delivered to it by an investment banking attorney and a Southern 
Democrat. As the following quotation indicates, Kelso envisions 
the role of the union under "Universal Capitalism" as an 
emasculated ESOP booster club. 
Under Capitalism, the labor union will obviously not be 
needed as an instrument of power to effect a laboristic 
distribution of wealth. This was the function it performed 
in the transition from primitive to mixed capitalism, and is 
still performing. But to say that the labor union will not be 
needed to perform this function in a justly organized 
economy, with diffused ownership of capital and a 
capitalistic distribution of wealth, is not to say that there will 
then be no socially useful service for it to undertake. 
Voluntary associations of capitalist workers, operating 
through democratic processes of self-government, may serve 
their own members and the whole society by functioning 
as agencies for the economic education of the newly-made 
capitalists, and as instruments for the protection of their 
property rights. [The Capitalist Manifesto, 1958, p. 157.] 
If unions are to give up their traditional role of protecting the 
workers and influencing management through collective 
bargaining, then does Kelso expect the workers to use their new-
found "ownership rights" to democratically self-govern their work? 
Apparently not. 
Manager-employees should manage, and non-manager 
employees should be beneficial owners, but should not 
interfere with management. Amateur management is the last 
thing such a concern needs. [Testimony before House 
Committee on Small Business, 1979, p. 136.] 
Thus, workers are to forfeit traditional collective bargaining and 
then turn over their fate to a professional caste of managers. 
According to Kelso, the employees should not "amateurishly" 
interfere with the managers who are "professionally" telling the 
workers what to do. It is easy to see why workers and unions are 
not more enthusiastic about this vision of industrial relations in 
the brave new world of Universal Capitalism. 
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ESOP Ownership as Second-Class Ownership Without Control 
Progressive ESOP advocates would like to dismiss these views of 
Kelso and others as individual idiosyncrasies—which just 
coincidentally are shared by all but a handful of ESOP boosters. 
But these ideas about the "proper" role for labor are unfortunately 
built into the typical ESOP design. Trusts are usually set up when 
someone is not "trusted" with direct ownership. The trust 
mechanism interposes a layer of trustees between the indirect 
"beneficial owners" and the exercise of ownership rights. 
Trusts are used, for example, when the beneficial owners are 
children, or are legally incompetent. Trust mechanisms have also 
been used to separate the control of massive pension funds from 
the worker-beneficiaries. As a result, the pension funds have been 
used to finance the export of jobs to union-free environments. 
ESOPs use the trust mechanism. When Kelso refers to the 
employees as just being "beneficial owners," that is not a Kelso 
eccentricity. This is the language of the Federal ERISA law. The 
"employee-owners" are insulated from the control of their own 
worklives by the trustees who exercise the votes in the "best 
interests" of the worker-owners. For ESOP workers, as for 
children, the ownership is put in a "trust" because the ultimate 
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owners are not trusted. 
This insulation of control from the workers underlies the ESOP 
vision. It is a vision of society split between an elite including top 
managers, industrialists, bankers, and lawyers on the one side, and 
the other people such as their employees on the other side. It is 
a "populist" vision of placating the workers by letting them in 
on "a piece of the action" in a manner appropriate to their station 
in life. 
In this vision, there are really two classes of ownership: 
(1) first-class ownership for the elite, and 
(2) second-class or beneficial ownership for the workers. 
First-class ownership is ownership with control. Second-class 
ownership is "ownership" without control. 
A striking example of first- and second-class ownership is the 
allocation of control in leveraged buyouts. There has been a recent 
spate of non-ESOP leveraged buyouts by management. Even 
though the stock is purchased with borrowed money, the managers 
exercise the votes of the shares they have purchased. That is first-
class ownership. But in the typical employee leveraged buyout 
organized through an ESOP, the employees only get to vote "their" 
shares as the loans are paid off. In the meantime, management 
and the financiers exercise control over the firm. That ESOP 
employee-ownership is second-class ownership. In both cases, the 
shares were purchased with borrowed money. In one case, the 
owners vote the shares and, in the other case, the owners do not. 
A Democratic ESOP? 
ESOPs were designed to promote worker capitalism, not worker 
democracy. Is it possible to restructure an ESOP to make it more 
democratic, to put some control in the hands of the employee-
owners? One basic principle of democracy, fundamental to both 
political democracy and the union movement, is the one 
person/one vote rule. There seem to be two ways to rig an ESOP 
to make it more democratic: (1) the two-tiered scheme; and, 
(2) the two share classes scheme. 
In the two-tiered scheme, the votes are not passed through even 
on allocated shares, so that all votes are exercised by the trust 
committee. But then the ESOP agreement also specifies that the 
trust committee will follow the voting instructions of the 
employee-owners. The employee-owners vote, on a one 
person/one vote basis, about how to instruct the trust committee 
to vote the shares. The few democratic ESOPs, such as the Solar 
Center in San Francisco, Rath Packing in Iowa, Atlas Chain in 
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Pennsylvania, and the recent Seymour Specialty Wire in 
Connecticut, all use variations on the two-tiered voting structure 
to satisfy the one person/one vote rule. 
There is a difference, however, between using this two-tiered 
scheme and having it stand up to legal and governmental scrutiny 
when challenged. In particular, it is not clear how to reconcile 
the fiduciary duties of the trustees with the agreement to obey 
the instructions of the beneficiaries should a case arise where there 
is a perceived divergence between the two obligations. 
In the two share classes scheme, there would be voting and non-
voting stock. Each employee-owner would get one share of voting 
stock and the vote would be passed through. The remaining shares 
would be non-voting. This scheme seems preferable because the 
votes are directly exercised by the workers. However, the status 
of this scheme is unclear under present legislation. Current law 
requires ESOP shares to have the highest combination of voting 
and dividend rights, commonly interpreted to exclude non-voting 
shares. Pending a definitive interpretation of the law or new 
legislation, a one person/one vote ESOP, using the two share 
classes, is potentially in conflict with ESOP law. 
Both schemes make the ownership more first-class by 
overcoming the barrier the ESOP trust puts between the workers 
and their voting rights. The two-tiered scheme does an "end-run" 
around the trust by having the trustee vote the shares according 
to a separate vote taken by the employees. The two-class scheme 
breaks through the wall by having the votes "passed through" to 
the workers. 
Another problem is to keep the ownership in the workers' hands 
over the course of time. As workers leave, their vested shares are 
ordinarily issued to them so the shares could be sold to outsiders. 
Recent legislation allows a company to insure maintenance of the 
shares in the ESOP trust through a buy-back arrangement. The 
norm, however, is to permit the gradual leakage of shares beyond 
the workforce. 
These schemes work to endow an ESOP with cooperative 
attributes. For example, ESOPs are designed to base voting on 
property rights, so more votes accrue to those with more invested 
capital. By overriding that with a one person/one vote scheme, 
the property rights basis is partially transformed into a treatment 
of voting rights as personal rights. Another prominent 
characteristic of property rights is their marketability. By setting 
up a mandatory buy-back of the shares, that marketability 
characteristic is also negated in another move in the direction of 
treating the membership rights as non-transferable personal rights. 
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In each concrete case, the appropriate legal structure for worker 
ownership will depend on a complex set of factors which cannot 
be considered here. The point is that there is a wide range of legal 
possibilities. There are worker capitalist schemes designed to 
undermine union influence with visions of "ownership" while at 
the same time insuring that it is second-class ownership without 
control. There are also legal structures designed for democratic 
worker ownership where there is one person/one vote, where 
labor hires capital, and where the ownership rights are 
transformed into labor-based membership rights. The latter can 
be approximated by using a worker cooperative structure and/or 
a democratically restructured ESOP. 
In either case, the union has a vigorous role with some new 
challenges. In the imposed management-dominated ESOPs, the 
union can bring a whole new set of issues to the bargaining table, 
the issues of turning second-class ownership into first-class owner-
ship. In the worker co-ops or restructured ESOPs where the 
worker-ownership is already first-class, the union faces new 
challenges and opportunities both inside and outside the firm. 
Inside the firm, the union has the role of guaranteeing the 
democratic rights of the members by serving as the "legitimate 
opposition." Outside the firm, the union can provide the links 
between the individual worker-owned firm, other worker-owned 
firms, and the broader labor movement. Labor solidarity can then 
take on new forms to meet the technical, managerial, marketing, 
and capital needs of the unionized democratic worker-owned 
firms. 
Populism: Broadened Ownership Rights 
or Broadened Human Rights 
What about "broadened ownership"? Isn't it a populist idea? If 
not, what is the genuinely populist alternative? 
Before the political democratic revolutions in the West, political 
sovereignty over people's lives was based on property rights in 
land. The monarch was the ultimate owner and ruler of the land. 
Power was sometimes delegated to lesser nobilities who "owned" 
or had "tenancy" and thus governed various regions of the 
country. The ownership of land was equated with political 
sovereignty over the people on the land. The landlord was the Lord 
of the Land. 
Given such an ownership-based system of political government, 
one could imagine two strategies for the transition to political 
democracy: 
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(1) a broadened ownership rights strategy, or 
(2) a broadened human rights strategy. 
In the broadened ownership approach, the equation between land 
ownership and political sovereignty would not be challenged. 
Instead, the idea would be to "democratize" and broaden the 
ownership of land, to "give the little guy a piece of the action." 
By becoming small landholders, some people would then gain a 
small measure of political control over their lives. 
In the broadened human rights approach, the idea would be to 
sever the connection between land ownership and political control 
so that the rights to govern the people residing in a community 
could be transformed into personal rights assigned to the 
functional role of residing in that community. 
While there was some weakening of the grip of traditional 
landed property by the development of numerous small holders, 
the political democratic revolutions ultimately took the human 
rights approach and did not stop short with mere "broadened 
ownership." There are good theoretical and practical reasons for 
this. Theoretically, the right to democratic self-determination 
should be a human right, not a property right which must be 
"purchased" from its prior "owners." From a practical viewpoint, 
it is a will-o-wisp to think that political democracy could be 
approximated by keeping the rights to govern people's lives as 
property rights. 
It is a fundamental fact that property rights can be concentrated 
into a few hands, while personal rights are automatically 
decentralized on a "one-per-person" basis. As long as political 
power was based on property ownership, it would be futile to 
expect the broadened ownership of small landholders to 
fundamentally challenge the historical concentrations of property 
and power. Political democracy was only established by removing 
the question of political sovereignty from the whole arena of 
property rights through universal suffrage without property 
qualifications. 
The history of social progress is the history of transforming 
certain property rights into human rights. 
Today, the next step in social progress is the democratization 
of industry, extending democracy to the economic sphere. As one 
might expect, there are two strategies: (1) the broadened 
ownership rights strategy, and (2) the broadened human rights 
strategy. The broadened ownership strategy accepts that the 
control of people's worklives should be a matter of owning certain 
property rights, but argues that the ownership of such rights 
ESOPs 8c CO-OPs 69 
>etween land 
challenged, 
broaden the 
: the action." 
i then gain a 
i would be to 
litical control 
i community 
gned to the 
Df traditional 
.mail holders, 
k the human 
i "broadened 
al reasons for 
letermination 
hich must be 
:al viewpoint, 
acy could be 
Dple's lives as 
* concentrated 
automatically 
ig as political 
Id be futile to 
mdholders to 
of property 
d by removing 
hole arena of 
property 
should be "broadened." The human rights strategy argues that the 
right of democratic self-determination should be a human right 
in the workplace as it already is in the political sphere. 
Each strategy is represented by a legal structure for the 
organization of a firm, the conventional ESOP structure and the 
worker cooperative structure (with or without a democratized 
ESOP). Since conventional ESOPs do not challenge the traditional 
role of property rights in industry, ESOPs are much more 
"realistic" to bankers, corporate lawyers, managers, and 
conservative politicians. The massive historical accumulations of 
property and economic power are not challenged by creating more 
microscopic employee-shareholders through broadened ownership 
and worker's capitalism. At best, the workers will get hooked on 
a game they cannot win. At the very least, conventional ESOPs 
will confuse, divide, and undermine the labor movement. Thus, 
the economic powers-that-be are hardly worried and, indeed, may 
be quite supportive, when "populist reformers" expend their 
energies trying to broaden the ownership of corporate capital. 
Property rights can always be concentrated; personal rights 
cannot. As long as "populist reformers" stick to the game of 
property, power will always tend to remain in the same hands. 
Genuine populism must change the rules of the game so that 
the control of industry will be people-based rather than property-
based. Progress points in the direction of further democratization 
of industry by moving the control over people's worklives from 
the domain of property to the domain of human rights. Towards 
these ends, the best available means are unionized democratic 
worker-owned firms structured as worker-owned cooperatives 
and/or democratized ESOPs. • 
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